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Boumediene as a Constitutional Mandate:
Bivens Actions at Guantainamo Bay
by IAN SAMSON*
Introduction
This note argues that detainees held at Guantdnamo Bay, Cuba,
should be able to bring Bivens actions against individual federal
officials for maltreatment. The argument is based on Boumediene v.
Bush, which extended the Suspension Clause to Guantdnamo Bay
detainees held outside of de jure American territory but under de
facto American control.' The reasoning underlying Boumediene
makes it difficult to limit its reach to a narrow set of Constitutional
guarantees. Instead, federal courts will likely read the case
expansively. If so, detainees will enjoy access to a broader spectrum
of constitutional rights, including the right to have federal courts hear
Bivens suits against individuals involved in the maltreatment or
torture of detainees while in American custody.
Such a development should not be viewed as a "win" for
terrorists and a "loss" for America. Bivens actions for federal
prisoners held in the United States forced the federal system to be
more accountable to its citizens and more true to the ideals of the
country. Bivens actions for detainees would again force the system to
become more accountable, which would make detention more
humane and internationally justifiable. I offer no judgment on the
ability of detainees to win a Bivens action, or on any evidentiary
problems that might hinder their chances. Instead, I argue that a
rational application of Boumediene compels Bivens actions for
detainees.
* J.D. Candidate, University of California, Hastings College of the Law, 2011. The
author would like to thank Professor Evan Lee, Associate Dean for Research, U.C.
Hastings, for his tremendous support and guidance. The author would also like to thank
his parents, Mark and Sara Samson, and Ruth Saperstein, for their love, support, input,
and typo-catching eyes.
1. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723; 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008).
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I. Background on the War on Terror
The "War on Terror" began in earnest following the September
11 attacks carried out by a radical Islamic terrorist organization, Al
Qaeda.2 After those attacks, President George W. Bush addressed
Congress on September 20, 2001, and assured lawmakers and the
American people that the United States was committed to bringing
those responsible to justice and preventing future attacks.' Previous
administrations had warned of external threats years before, but the
Bush administration began an intense campaign of investigating,
capturing, and detaining suspects believed to be directly involved with
terrorism or sympathetic to Al Qaeda and its mission.' The very
fervor of the efforts left many in the world with the impression that
the country was committed to a single-minded approach to non-
Americans: you're either with us or against us.
The legislative response to the newly coined "War on Terror"
began almost immediately. On September 14, 2001, both houses of
Congress passed an "Authorization for Use of Military Force."'
President Bush signed the authorization on September 18, 2001.' This
document allowed the President to:
[Ulse all necessary and appropriate force against those nations,
organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized,
committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on
September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or persons,
in order to prevent any future acts of international terrorism
against the United States by such nations, organizations or
8persons.
Given this power, President Bush rounded up terrorism suspects,
holding them at various sites around the globe, including the
2. For a general background and history of the 9/11 attacks see NAT'L COMM'N ON
TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE U.S., 9/11 COMMIssioN REPORT (2004), available at
http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/911/report/index.htm.
3. President George W. Bush, Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on
the United States Response to the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2 PUB. PAPERS
1140 (Sept. 20,2001).
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001)
[hereinafter AUMF].
7. Id.
8. Id. at §2(a).
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American naval base at Guantinamo Bay.' Over the course of the
"War on Terror," a total of 759 detainees, all foreign nationals, have
been held at Guantdnamo.o Many of the detainees alleged that they
were subjected to maltreatment, religious discrimination, and even
torture." During his presidential campaign, then-Senator Barack
Obama promised to close Guantdnamo and move its detainees to
existing American prisons. 2 On January 21, 2009, President Obama
issued an executive order to close Guantdnamo." However, as of
January 2010, the prison at Guantdnamo remains active. 4
When the Bush Administration began detaining suspected
terrorists, cases on their behalf began to make their way through the
federal court system. In its first opinion on the subject, the United
States Supreme Court held that the detention of enemy combatants
was universally accepted as a necessary element of war, but that the
administration would have to prove that each detainee was an
"enemy combatant."" To comply, the administration decided it
would hold a hearing for each detainee in front of a Combat Status
Review Board, which would determine whether the detainee was an
"enemy combatant." 6 In the meantime, though, several detainees (or
their families) had filed habeas corpus petitions in the U.S. District
Court for the District of Columbia in a case called Rasul v. Bush.7
9. These sites include Bagram Air Force Base in Afghanistan, domestic and
international military prisons, secret CIA "black sites," and the infamous Guantanamo
Bay naval base. See Jane Mayer, The Black Sites: A Rare Look Inside the C.I.A.'s Secret
Interrogation Program, THE NEW YORKER, Aug. 13, 2007, available at
http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2007/08/13/070813fa-fact-mayer.
10. See OFFICE OF THE SEC'Y OF DEF. AND JOINT STAFF, List of Individuals
Detained by the Department of Defense at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba from January 2002
through May 15, 2006 (Dep't of Defense May 16, 2006), http://www.dod.mil/pubs/foi/
detainees/detaineesFOLAreleasel5May2006.pdf [hereinafter List of Guantanamo Detainees].
11. See Bob Woodward, Detainee Tortured, Says U.S. Official, WASH. POST, Jan. 14,
2009, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/01/13/
AR2009011303372.html; 'Religious Abuse' at Guantanamo, BBC NEWS, Feb. 10, 2004,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hilamericas/4255559.stm.
12. See Mark Mazzetti & William Glaberson, Obama Issues Directive to Shut Down
Guantdnamo, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 21, 2009, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/22/
us/politics/22gitmo.html.
13. Id.
14. See One Year Later, Guantanamo Still Open, CBS NEWS (Jan. 22, 2010),
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2010/01/22/politics/main6129494.shtml.
15. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 518 (2004) (citing Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1,
28, 30 (1942)).
16. Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2233 (2008).
17. Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 471-72 (2004).
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The government argued in response that the Supreme Court's
decision in Johnson v. Eisentrager foreclosed habeas corpus rights to
extraterritorial detainees." Both the District Court and the Court of
Appeals agreed." The Supreme Court reversed, holding that 28
U.S.C. § 2241 extended statutory habeas corpus rights to
Guantdnamo Bay detainees."
As Rasul was pending in the courts, Congress passed the
Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 ("DTA"), which amended 28 U.S.C.
§ 2241 to explicitly strip the federal courts of habeas corpus
jurisdiction over Guantinamo Bay detainees and vested exclusive
power of review of the Combat Status Review Tribunal Boards in the
Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit.21 Shortly thereafter, in
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, the Supreme Court held that the DTA did not
apply retroactively to existing habeas corpus petitions, allowing those
claims to move forward.22
Congress responded with the Military Commissions Act of 2006
("MCA"), which forbade federal courts from entertaining any habeas
corpus proceeding for a Guantdnamo Bay detainee.23 Unlike the
DTA-which only erased statutory habeas corpus jurisdiction-the
MCA sought suspension of all habeas corpus rights for such
detainees.24 Congress's intent was specific and broad; the MCA
would eliminate both statutory and constitutional guarantees of
habeas corpus to all detainees in United States custody, no matter
where they were held.' This was a startling expansion of the
suspension allowed in Eisentrager. That decision applied only to
temporary military prisons existing on foreign soil and over which
foreign sovereignty was still intact.26 The MCA, on the other hand,
affected constitutional rights in facilities over which the United States
18. Id. at 472-73; Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950).
19. See Rasul v. Bush, 215 F. Supp. 2d 55 (D.D.C. 2002), aff'd, Al-Odah v. United
States, 321 F.3d 1134 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
20. Rasul, 542 U.S. at 473.
21. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2234; see also Pub. L. 109-148, 119 Stat. 2739 (2005).
22. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 576-77 (2006).
23. Military Commissions Act of 2006, 10 U.S.C. § 948a et seq. The Court noted in
Boumediene that while four justices had invited Congress to set up a system for trying
detainees by military commission, it did not invite them to suspend the writ of habeas
corpus. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct at 2242.
24. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2242.
25. Id.
26. Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 766 (1950).
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enjoyed absolute control.27 The showdown was set: would the Court
allow Congress to suspend the Great Writ that broadly?
II. A Change in Analysis: Boumediene v. Bush
In Boumediene, the Court faced the decision of whether the
Constitution applied to the long-standing American base at
Guantinamo Bay.8 Justice Anthony Kennedy, writing for the
majority, rejected the MCA and held that the constitutional
guarantee of habeas corpus applied to Guantinamo Bay detainees.2
Congress did not have the power to abolish or interfere with it.30 The
Court rejected both the government's reliance on Eisentrager and its
insistence that the right to habeas corpus automatically ceased
outside of the de jure sovereignty of the United States." In the
Court's eyes, even though Cuba technically retained de jure
sovereignty, the constitutional guarantee of habeas corpus applied at
Guantinamo Bay.32
Justice Kennedy's analysis began by looking at the original lease
agreement between the United States and Cuba for Guantdnamo
Bay." The agreement stipulated that Cuba would retain "ultimate
sovereignty" while the United States possessed "complete jurisdiction
and control."34 Then Justice Kennedy turned to a subsequent 1934
agreement, which effectively eliminated Cuban sovereignty. Absent a
new agreement between the parties, Cuban sovereignty was
finished.35 The 1934 agreement could have been the basis of a strong
argument that de jure sovereignty had passed to the United States.
Instead, basing his opinion on the long-standing tradition of judicial
deference to political branches in deciding questions of sovereignty,
27. See 10 U.S.C. §§ 948-50; Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2261-62.
28. Throughout the life of the Republic, the boundaries of the Constitution's reach
have changed with new realities. See generally GERALD L. NEUMAN, STRANGERS TO THE
CONSTITUTION: IMMIGRANTS, BORDERS, AND FUNDAMENTAL LAW (1996); Kermit
Roosevelt III, Guantanamo and the Conflict of Laws: Rasul and Beyond, 153 U. PA. L.
REV. 2017,2042-59 (2005).
29. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2274.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 2257-58.
32. Id. at 2261-62.
33. Id. at 2251.
34. Id. at 2252 (citing Lease of Lands for Coaling and Naval Stations, U.S.-Cuba, art.
III, Feb. 23, 1903, T.S. No. 418).
35. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2252 (citing Treaty Defining Relations with Cuba, U.S.-
Cuba, art. III, May 29, 1934, 48 Stat. 1683, T.S. No. 866).
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Justice Kennedy ratified the government's contention that Cuba still
36
retained a technical, de jure sovereignty over Guantanamo.
That was not the end of the analysis, however. Justice Kennedy
flatly rejected the government's premise that "de jure sovereignty is
the touchstone of habeas corpus jurisdiction."" The distinction that
mattered, he wrote, was between de jure sovereignty and plenary
control. Skeptical of the overall usefulness of "sovereignty" as the
determinative factor, he noted that there were two different
conceptions of sovereignty-"legal" and "colloquial."3  Colloquial
sovereignty is the common sense, dictionary usage-an "exercise of
dominion or power."" Legal sovereignty, on the other hand, is a
more narrowly drawn conception, referring to a "claim of right."41
Determining which conception of sovereignty was in play was
important, Justice Kennedy maintained, because while the judiciary
defers to political branches on questions of legal sovereignty, it does
not defer when the question is the practical one of colloquial
sovereignty-who is exercising dominion of power in a given setting.42
Therefore, forced to defer to the legislature and executive on "legal"
sovereignty, the Court had to agree that the United States was not the
de jure sovereign of Guantdinamo.4 But, the Court did not have to
defer on the "obvious and uncontested fact" that the United States
enjoyed de facto control of the base under sovereignty's colloquial
definition." Thus, the outcome would depend on the choice between
a rote application of de jure sovereignty or a more nuanced approach
to determine the actual status of the detention center at issue.
Justice Kennedy began that task by examining previous decisions
that "undermine[d] the government's argument that, at least as
applied to noncitizens, the Constitution necessarily stops where de
36. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2252 (quoting Vermilya-Brown Co., Inc. v. Connell, 335
U.S. 377, 389 (1947) ("[D]etermination of sovereignty over an area is for the legislative
and executive departments")).
37. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2253.
38. Id. at 2252-53.
39. Id. at 2252.
40. Id. at 2252 (citing WEBSTER'S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2406 (2d
ed.1934) ("sovereignty," definition 3)).
41. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2252 (citing 1 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 206, cmt. b, p. 94 (1986)).
42. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2252.
43. Id. at 2253.
44. Id.
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jure sovereignty ends."45 This was not a question that could be
answered by a direct appeal to the Framers' intent. The opinion
notes that even though the Framers had predicted that the Nation
would expand and add new territory, the document itself is silent on
how it should be applied extraterritorially. 46
Prior to the twentieth century, it was customary for Congress to
extend constitutional protections beyond state boundaries by
statute.47  The issue of what the Constitution meant with respect to
extraterritorial application arose at the turn of the twentieth century,
when the famous Insular Cases addressed the question of whether the
Constitution applied to United States territories in the absence of a
Congressional statute saying it did.48 The Insular Cases split the baby,
determining that the Constitution applied independently in territories
destined for statehood. In those territories no statute was necessary,
as constitutional application was not "contingent upon legislative
grace." 49 In territories not bound for statehood, however, it applied
only partially.o The Insular Cases alone could not answer Justice
Kennedy's question. The United States had never intended
Guantinamo Bay to achieve statehood (acquiring it for use as a
military facility in the Caribbean Sea)," but the Court had recognized
in Balzac v. Porto Rico that the government was required to provide
"guaranties of certain fundamental personal rights declared in the
Constitution" even in those territories not destined for statehood.52
45. Id. (emphasis added).
46. Id.; see generally Neuman, supra note 28.
47. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2253; see also Christian Burnett, Untied States:
American Expansion and Territorial Deannexation, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 797, 825-27 (2005).
48. See De Lima v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 1 (1901); Dooley v. United States, 182 U.S. 222
(1901); Armstrong v. United States, 182 U.S. 243 (1901); Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244
(1901); Hawaii v. Mankichi, 190 U.S. 197 (1903); Dorr v. United States, 195 U.S. 138
(1904) ("Insular Cases").
49. Id.
50. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2254 (quoting Dorr, 195 U.S. at 143 ("Until Congress
shall see fit to incorporate territory ceded by treaty into the United States ... the territory
is to be governed under the power existing in Congress to make laws for such territories
and subject to such constitutional restrictions upon the powers of that body as are
applicable to the situation") and Downes, 182 U.S. at 293 (White, J., concurring) ("[T)he
determination of what particular provision of the Constitution is applicable, generally
speaking, in all cases, involves an inquiry into the situation of the territory and its relations
to the United States")).
51. See Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2251-52 (citing Lease of Lands for Coaling and
Naval Stations, supra note 34).
52. Balzac v. People of Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298, 312 (1922).
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Justice Kennedy's analysis in Boumediene was also strongly
influenced by Reid v. Covert, a case in which the Court fragmented
sharply over the meaning of the Insular Cases." Reid concerned
spouses of American servicemen stationed overseas who had been
tried and convicted by court-martial for murdering their husbands.54
Writing for the plurality, Justice Hugo Black determined that the
wives' American citizenship guaranteed them constitutional rights
related to criminal trials and reversed the convictions." Justice John
Marshall Harlan, writing for himself in a concurrence, read the
Insular Cases as evaluating the "particular circumstances, the
practical necessities, and the possible alternatives which Congress had
before it," and whether extraterritorial application of relevant
constitutional rights would be "impracticable and anomalous" based
on the circumstances of each case." Justice Harlan's approach
rejected reliance on rigid formalism alone in favor of a functional,
case-by-case approach for extraterritorial application.
In his concurrence in United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, Justice
Kennedy adopted Justice Harlan's "impracticable and anomalous"
test from Reid in discussing extraterritorial application of the Fourth
Amendment. At issue were claims for alleged Fourth Amendment
violations against a Mexican citizen by American agents operating
within Mexico." A majority of the Court, led by Chief Justice
William Rehnquist, held that the Fourth Amendment did not apply to
the agents' activities." Using Justice Harlan's formula, Justice
Kennedy concurred in denying those claimsf0 Justice Kennedy's
adoption of the "impracticable and anomalous" test in Verdugo-
Urquidez foreshadowed his abandonment of rigid, formulaic rules to
the more functional, case-by-case approach for extraterritorial
application of the Constitution that he applied in Boumediene.
Another case on the extraterritorial reach of the Constitution
discussed in Reid was In re Ross.62 The Ross Court held that a non-
53. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957).
54. Id. at 3.
55. Id. at 40.
56. Id. at 75-76 (Harlan, J., concurring).
57. Id.
58. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 262 (1990).
59. Id. at 274-75.
60. Id. at 277-78 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
61. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2257-58.
62. In re Ross, 140 U.S. 453 (1891).
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citizen was entitled to the full spectrum of constitutional rights
because he had enlisted as a seaman on an American ship.63 Despite
that finding, the Ross Court eventually determined that the seaman
was not entitled to Fifth or Sixth Amendment rights during a trial for
a maritime crime.6 In Boumediene, Justice Kennedy carefully traced
the dispute among the Justices in Reid concerning the continued
vitality of Ross. The Reid plurality, led by Justice Black, would have
overruled Ross, meaning that the circumstances in a given case would
have no bearing on the extraterritorial application of constitutional
protections to trials by overseas American institutions." Instead, the
Reid plurality would have made citizenship the determinative factor
for extraterritorial application." But the Reid plurality did not have
the votes to overrule Ross because Justices Harlan and Frankfurter
would not go along.67 Justice Harlan's concurring opinion therefore
focused on analyzing the differences in practical circumstances that
led to the opposite results in Reid and Ross.6 Just as he did before,
Justice Kennedy followed this reasoning in Verdugo-Urquidez, noting
that Ross had not been overruled and that extraterritorial application
of the Constitution was contingent upon more than mere citizenship.
As a result, as one commentator has noted, Justice Kennedy
approaches any question of extraterritorial application of
constitutional provisions by asking Justice Harlan's question in
Reid-whether such an application would be "impracticable and
anomalous."7  Justice Kennedy's concurrence in Verdugo-Urquidez
made his adoption of Justice Harlan's approach very clear. It also
informed his reading of Eisentrager, the case to which the
Boumediene opinion turned next."
63. Id. at 479.
64. Id. at 464.
65. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2256 (citing Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1957)).
66. Reid, 354 U.S. at 11-12.
67. See id. at 50 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (citing Ross as reinforcing the "power of
Congress to 'make all needful Rules and Regulations"' for the Territories. Ross, 140 U.S.
at 453).
68. Reid, 354 U.S. at 75 (Harlan, J., concurring).
69. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 277 (1990) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring).
70. Jeffrey Kahn, Zoya's Standing Problem, Or, When Should the Constitution Follow
the Flag?, 108 MICH. L. REV. 673, 712 (2010) (discussing extraterritorial application of the
Takings Clause).
71. See Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 276-77 (Kennedy, J., concurring);
Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2257-58 (2008).
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Eisentrager was the case on which the government's argument in
Boumediene primarily relied.72 The Eisentrager Court had refused to
extend habeas corpus to German POWs held at Landsberg Prison in
Germany.73 In Boumediene, the government argued that Eisentrager
was a simple application of formalistic reasoning-because the
prisoners were noncitizens held outside the de jure sovereignty of the
United States, the Constitution and habeas corpus did not apply.74
Justice Kennedy, however, characterized the reasoning in Eisentrager
as an analysis of circumstances ("balanc[ing] the constraints of
military occupation with constitutional necessities") rather than a
strictly formalistic approach to extraterritorial constitutional
application.7 ' By casting Eisentrager in those terms, Justice Kennedy
made it clear that his adoption of Justice Harlan's "impracticable and
anomalous" test from Reid in his Verdugo-Urquidez opinion was not
a one-time expediency. To Justice Kennedy, analysis of the
circumstances is a necessary part of deciding the extraterritorial reach
of Constitutional rights.
The Boumediene opinion rejected the government's
interpretation of Eisentrager on three distinct grounds. First, the
government's reading of a particular passage of Eisentrager as
establishing a formalistic, de jure sovereignty-based test was
inconsistent with Justice Kennedy's earlier holding in the decision
that de jure sovereignty did not end the analysis." Second, Justice
Kennedy supported that conclusion by noting that the Eisentrager
opinion's own discussion of the practical barriers to habeas corpus for
inmates at Landsberg Prison in Germany indicated that the Court was
not resting its decision solely on the lack of the United States' de jure
79
sovereignty over the prison. Indeed, the Eisentrager opinion used
"territorial sovereignty" only twice, suggesting that de jure
sovereignty was not a bright-line rule, but merely one of the factors in
72. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2257.
73. Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 779 (1950).
74. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2257 (quoting Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 778 ("[Alt no
relevant time were within any territory over which the United States is sovereign, and
[that] the scenes of their offense, their capture, their trial and their punishment were all
beyond the territorial jurisdiction of any court of the United States.").
75. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2257 (citing Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 769-79).
76. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 74-75 (1957) (Harlan, J., concurring); Verdugo-
Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 276-77 (Kennedy, J., concurring); see also Kahn, supra note 70.
77. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2257.
78. Id. (citing Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 781).
79. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2257-58.
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the analysis.8 Finally, acceptance of the government's reading of
Eisentrager would undermine the "functional approach to questions
of extraterritoriality" illustrated in the Insular Cases and Reid.8 1 Just
as the authors of those earlier cases had done, Justice Kennedy
rejected a bright-line, formalistic rule in favor of a functional test for
extraterritorial application of the Constitution."
In a final flourish, Justice Kennedy reasoned that allowing the
political branches to define the limits of habeas corpus jurisdiction by
delimiting United States de jure sovereignty defied traditional
separation-of-powers notions and directly undercut the purposes of
habeas corpus.83 Justice Kennedy stressed that this reasoning did not
depart from existing law, because Supreme Court precedent clearly
held that "questions of extraterritoriality turn on objective factors
and practical concerns, not formalism."' With four other justices
joining Justice Kennedy's opinion in Boumediene, it appears that
Justice Harlan's "impracticable and anomalous" test currently
controls the analysis.
III. The Circumstances of Webster Bivens
In the early morning hours of November 26, 1965, agents from
the Federal Bureau of Narcotics entered Webster Bivens's New York
City apartment and arrested him for narcotics violations." The agents
had no warrant to arrest Bivens or to search his apartment.86 In the
course of the arrest, they handcuffed Bivens in front of his wife and
children, threatened to arrest his entire family, and extensively
searched his apartment.' Once Bivens arrived at the federal
courthouse in Brooklyn, he was interrogated, booked, and subjected
to a strip search."
Unlike cases in which accusations of police misconduct are raised
to defeat a criminal complaint, Bivens filed suit against the agents as
individuals, alleging that they had violated his federal constitutional
80. Id. (citing Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 778, 780).
81. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2258.
82. Id. at 2257-58.
83. Id. at 2258.
84. Id.
85. Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 389 (1971).
86. Id. at 390.
87. Id. at 389.
88. Id.
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rights.89 Ultimately, five agents were served with the complaint." The
agents urged the Court to dismiss Bivens's claim for want of
jurisdiction, arguing that while Bivens might have a remedy for their
behavior, he could only obtain it through state tort law in state
courts.91
When the case reached the Supreme Court, Justice William
Brennan forcefully rejected this jurisdictional argument, arguing that
the agents' view of the Fourth Amendment would limit it to a defense
tactic in state tort law actions-excusing their tortious conduct if
federal agents could prove the conduct was a "valid exercise of
federal power."" Justice Brennan held it was more-an affirmative
grant of right to individual citizens.93 Furthermore, he distinguished
Bivens's case, which involved government agents acting under color
of federal law, from a tort action between two ordinary citizens. 94
Because of their status as federal officials, the agents possessed great
power that did not disappear once abused.95 Indeed, Justice Brennan
argued, unconstitutional abuses of government power presented a far
more dangerous threat to individual citizens than did traditional
tortfeasors.% He analyzed the previous case law and concluded that
state tort remedies were designed with ordinary citizens in mind, not
authority-wielding federal agents. Thus, it was clear that a state
remedy could not adequately protect Bivens-there had to be a
federal remedy, and a federal forum to enforce it.99
To provide one, Justice Brennan drew upon the Court's
historical sense that damages are the "ordinary remedy for an
89. Id. at 390. Specifically, Bivens plead that the invasion of his rights caused him
great embarrassment, humiliation and mental anguish as a result of the agents conduct.
The Court characterized this claim as one essentially made for arrest without sufficient
probable cause. See id. at 389.
90. Id. at 390 n.2.
91. Id. at 390-91.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 391-92.
95. Id. at 392 ("[The agents] ignore the fact that power, once granted, does not
disappear like a magic gift when it is wrongfully used.").
96. Id. at 392 (citing United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 326 (1941); Amos v.
United States, 255 U.S. 313, 317 (1921)).
97. Bivens, 403 U.S. 392-95.
98. Id. at 396.
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invasion of personal interests in liberty."" While noting that the
Fourth Amendment did not specifically include a remedial scheme
for money damages, Justice Brennan relied on the principle that
federal courts had discretion to use any remedy to "make good the
wrong done" from violations of federal rights.'" In other words,
violation of a federal legal right required a federal remedy.101
In a part of the opinion that would later threaten to consume its
central holding, Justice Brennan limited the reach of future Bivens
remedies by enumerating several "special factors counseling
hesitation in the absence of affirmative action by Congress [to
provide for a statutory cause of action]."' The special factors he
named-federal fiscal policy, the government-soldier relationship,
and congressional employment-originated in prior cases and
demonstrated those arenas in which the Court had traditionally
deferred to Congressional judgment.103  Justice Brennan defined
"federal fiscal policy" by reference to the discreet question presented
in United States v. Standard Oil Co. of California.' In Standard Oil,
the Court refused to create a private remedy to allow the United
States to recover a soldier's medical expenses resulting from the
negligence of the defendant.o' The Standard Oil Court withheld
"creative touch" to fashion a remedy in a "field properly within
Congress' control and as to a matter concerning which it has seen fit
to take no action."1' In other words, judicial interference with
"federal fiscal policy" can be seen as seizing the Congressional
prerogative to spend and replacing it with court-mandated initiatives
not contemplated by the legislature. Similarly, Justice Brennan
distinguished Bivens's remedy from Wheeldin v. Wheeler, in which the
Court refused to interfere with Congressional abuse of power that
was outside the scope of discretion, but not unconstitutional. 7
Justice Brennan explained the reach of the "special factors"
analysis by differentiating between areas exclusively within
99. Id. at 395-96. Brennan noted that the Court had allowed similar suits before. See
generally Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73 (1932); Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927);
Swafford v. Templeton, 185 U.S. 487 (1902); Wiley v. Sinkler, 179 U.S. 58 (1900).
100. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 396 (quoting Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 684 (1946)).
101. See Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 147 (1803).
102. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 396.
103. Id.
104. United States v. Standard Oil Co. of CaL, 332 U.S. 301 (1947).
105. Id. at 316.
106. Id. at 316-17.
107. Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 373 U.S. 647, 652 (1963).
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Congressional control and fields that do not require express
Congressional action.'" He underscored that constitutional
protections like the Fourth Amendment are self-executing and do not
require an affirmative grant from Congress to be effective.'" Instead,
Justice Brennan asked only whether Bivens was entitled to a
"remedial mechanism normally available in the federal courts" upon
a showing of constitutional violations.no Satisfied that Bivens had
made this showing, Justice Brennan allowed him a federal remedy."'
IV. After Bivens: A New Meaning for Special Factors
Following Bivens, the Court dealt with several suits seeking to
expand private rights of action beyond the Fourth Amendment.
According to Stephen Vladeck, the modern Court addresses two
questions when confronted with a potential expansion of private
rights of action in the wake of Bivens: Whether any "special factors
counseling hesitancy" are present, and whether Congress has created
an alternative remedial scheme in lieu of a Bivens action.11 Early on,
the Court routinely recognized expansion of Bivens beyond the
Fourth Amendment by taking what James Pfander characterized as a
"matter of fact" approach to the two relevant inquiries."3 Along with
the expansion, Vladeck argues, came a new limiting force on Bivens
actions: Justice Brennan's "special factors" began to be used as an
absolute bar to a federal remedy, not just as factors that would
"counsel hesitancy."114
It was not long before the Court was openly acknowledging that
it "responded cautiously to suggestions that Bivens remedies be
extended into new contexts.""' Indeed, the Court seemed to become
focused on congressionally created remedial schemes and refused to
108. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 397.
109. Id.
110. Id. (citing J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 433 (1964); Jacobs v. United States,
290 U.S. 13, 16 (1933)).
111. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 397.
112. Stephen J. Vladeck, National Security and Bivens After Iqbal, 14 LEWIS & CLARK
L. REv. 255, 261-62 (2010).
113. Id. at 263 (citing James E. Pfander, The Story of Bivens v. Six Unknown Named
Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, FEDERAL COURTS STORIES 275, 295-96 (Vicki
C. Jackson & Judith Resnik eds., 2010)).
114. Vladeck, supra note 112, at 263 (citing Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14,16-18 (1980)
(expanding Bivens to Eighth Amendment protections against cruel and unusual
punishment)).
115. Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412, 421 (1988).
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infer Bivens actions that might compete with Congress's statutory
decisions. Bush v. Lucas illustrates the change.16 There, the Court
declined to infer a Bivens remedy for a federal employee claiming
employment discrimination in violation of the First Amendment. 1
Instead, the Court upheld an imperfect remedial scheme, reasoning
that "Congress is in a better position" than the courts to include a
Bivens remedy for government employees if it wanted one.
Similarly, in Schweiker v. Chilickly, the Court refused to recognize a
federal remedy for discharged Social Security beneficiaries, reasoning
that Congress's intricate remedial scheme foreclosed a Bivens action
by adequately protecting the aggrieved beneficiaries' rights." 9
The Court did not limit its deference to direct Congressional
action. In Chappell v. Wallace, several enlisted men alleged that their
superior officers violated their constitutional rights by engaging in
racial discrimination.'20 Asked to recognize a new Bivens remedy, the
Court refused, reasoning that military judgments such as training,
recruitment and control of the force were "subject always to civilian
control of the Legislative and Executive Branches."'2 1 Congress's
indirect control of military policies was a special factor that counseled
hesitancy in expanding Bivens to intra-military relationships.122
Similarly, in United States v. Stanley, the Court extended Chappell
beyond the relationships between officers and soldiers and applied it
to deny a remedy to an officer suing the United States government
for using him as a laboratory animal.'23 The Stanley plaintiff was an
officer who alleged that he had been secretly administered LSD as
part of an experiment, thereby violating his constitutional rights.24
Despite the outrageous nature of the military's conduct, the Court
denied the plaintiff a remedy, holding that Bivens remedies are not
available for "injuries that 'arise out of or are in the course of activity
incident to service."1 25 As a practical matter, after Stanley there are
116. Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 390 (1983).
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Schweiker, 487 U.S. at 429.
120. Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 302 (1983).
121. Id. at 302 (emphasis in original) (citing Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1, 10 (1973)).
122. Chappell, 462 U.S. 301.
123. United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669, 681-84 (1987).
124. Id. at 671-72.
125. Id. at 684 (quoting Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 146 (1950)).
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no Bivens remedies in the military context because of the Court's
near-total deference to the government-soldier relationship."'
The cases through Stanley concerned arenas in which the Court
could reasonably infer from the existence of a detailed remedial
scheme that "Congress expected the Judiciary to stay its Bivens hand"
or arenas that were clearly occupied by the political branches.' In
Wilkie v. Robbins, Justice David Souter analyzed "Bivens step two,"
testing the applicability of Bivens to arenas that lacked an express
Congressional remedial scheme or stood outside of those fields
traditionally reserved for the political branches.'2 According to
Vladeck, Wilkie cemented the Court's use of the "special factors"
analysis and represented the "high-water mark of the Court's
retrenchment from Bivens" which had begun in the 1980s. 2 9 Wilkie
involved a Bivens claim against Bureau of Land Management officials
for alleged harassment and intimidation during the Bureau's
negotiations for an easement over the plaintiff's property.'30 The
Court refused to infer a Bivens remedy after deciding that the
plaintiff's individual claims could be settled through a patchwork
system of state tort laws and administrative remedies."' Fearful of an
"onslaught of Bivens actions," the Court signaled that it would defer
to Congressional legislative judgment and recognize new Bivens
claims sparingly.13 2 Wilkie thus pushed Justice Brennan's "special
factors" analysis to new heights and expanded the reach of the
doctrine to include areas-like state tort law-that are not within
Congress's exclusive control.33  Instead, "special factors" under
Wilkie became a rubric of self-fulfilling prophecy. After Wilkie it
appeared that judicial economy, separation of powers, or anything
else that the Court could call a "special factor" was enough to deny a
Bivens remedy.'3
Read correctly, though, Wilkie did not completely shut the door
on the possibility of new Bivens-based actions. Instead, Wilkie urged
the District Courts to "weigh reasons for and against the creation of a
126. Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 396 (1971).
127. Wilkie v. Robbins, 551 U.S. 537, 554 (2007).
128. Id.
129. Vladeck, supra note 112, at 266.
130. Wilkie, 551 U.S. at 541.
131. Id. at 561-62.
132. Id. at 562.
133. See Vladeck, supra note 112, at 266.
134. Id.
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new cause of action, the way common law judges have always
done.""' Though disfavored, Bivens was still good law, and courts
were left with the discretion to infer a remedy in situations where one
had not existed before.3
V. Are the 'War on Terror' Cases a Place for a
Bivens Remedy?
Thus, there are three relevant inquires to determine whether to
apply Bivens to a constitutional claim made by a "War on Terror"
detainee. First, the allegations of the complaint must have occurred
within the reach of constitutional protections. Second, if the
Constitution applies, any Bivens remedy must not be preempted by a
pre-existing Congressional remedial scheme or any other special
factor. Finally, officials must not be entitled to qualified immunity for
their actions. This paper does not discuss every possible
constitutional injury that could give rise to a Bivens claim. I have
limited the analysis to one of the most likely such claims-
maltreatment of a detainee by guards-that implicates violations of
the Fifth and Eighth Amendments.
A. Step One - The Constitution Applies to Guantainamo Bay
The degree of the Constitution's application at Guantdnamo Bay
is the first step of the Bivens analysis. In Boumediene, the Court
recognized that Guantdnamo was de facto American territory,
thereby guaranteeing at least habeas corpus rights to detainees."'
The Court rejected the government's reliance upon the distinction
between de jure and de facto sovereignty as an improper dichotomy
for the purposes of extraterritorial application of the Constitution.
Furthermore, the Court highlighted that the Founders, expecting the
Nation to acquire new territory, intended for the Constitution to be a
fluid document that would expand along with growing boundaries
and changing times."' Beyond those arguments for full application,
Justice Kennedy's reliance upon Justice Harlan's "impracticable and
anomalous" standard from Reid strongly suggests that this analysis
135. Wilkie, 551 U.S. at 554 (citing Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 378 (1983)).
136. Willkie, 551 U.S. at 554.
137. Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2262 (2008).
138. Id. at 2252.
139. Id. at 2253.
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will be used to decide the question of extraterritorial constitutional
applicability at Guantdnamo.'40
Under that standard, applying the Bill of Rights to Guantinamo
detainees would be neither impracticable nor anomalous. First of all,
Guantdnamo is a far different place than the inarguably Mexican
territory where Justice Kennedy found that the "conditions and
considerations" did not support the application of the Fourth
Amendment to an extraterritorial arrest in his Verdugo-Urquidez
concurrence. 4 ' In Verdugo-Urquidez, Justice Kennedy relied on the
fact that the United States enjoyed neither de facto nor de jure
sovereignty over Mexico, where the arrest occurred.'42 His majority
opinion in Boumediene demonstrates clearly, however, that Justice
Kennedy views the American naval base at Guantinamo Bay
differently.143
Furthermore, the central holding of Boumediene is that there
were not "impracticable or anomalous" complications in allowing
detainees access to the Great Writ.'" Indeed, Justice Kennedy relied
on the exclusively American character of the naval base at
Guantdnamo as grounding for the extraterritorial application.'45 This
analysis reverses the result reached in Verdugo-Urquidez. There,
where Mexican authorities were sovereign and Mexican law was in
full force and effect, applying the Fourth Amendment to United
States government activities in Mexico would be an impractical and
anomalous attempt to impose an external and foreign law to
another's sovereign territory.'46 Both the impracticality and
anomalous nature of doing so is illustrated by the fact that all of the
activities of the United States' agents in Verdugo-Urquidez could
have been circumscribed by Mexican law if the sovereign power had
so intended.147 Accordingly, applying substantive constitutional
standards to an area governed by an entirely different set of laws
made little sense to Justice Kennedy.148 At Guantdnamo, however,
140. See id. at 2256; see also Kahn, supra note 70, at 712.
141. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 278 (1990) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring).
142. Id.
143. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2252-53.
144. Id. at 2258.
145. Id. at 2262.
146. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 278 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
147. Id.
148. Id.
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Cuban law does not control American activity, and Cuba does not
possess any actual authority over the base, a fact conceded by the
government in Boumediene.4 9
Thus, applying the Bill of Rights to Guantdnamo Bay would not
be "impracticable or anomalous." Unlike the Fourth Amendment
problem presented in Verdugo-Urquidez, American government
officials are not bound by foreign law when operating at Guantdnamo
Bay. Instead, as in Boumediene, any application of the Bill of Rights
to Guantdnamo would only impose American constitutional law upon
Americans and American prisoners at an installation that is within
the de facto sovereignty of the United States.' Just like the
application of habeas corpus, application of the Bill of Rights is
neither impracticable nor anomalous. Instead, under the functional
extraterritorial application test promulgated by Justice Kennedy in
Verdugo-Urquidez and Boumediene, the Constitution and its
guarantees should apply to Guantinamo Bay.
The D.C. Circuit views the application of Boumediene to Bivens
actions differently. In Rasul v. Myers, the court held that Boumediene
invalidated only a discrete portion of the MCA relating to habeas
corpus applicability and retained the statute's other restrictions on
detainee constitutional rights and judicial access."' Essentially, the
court distinguished Boumediene on the grounds that the opinion only
discussed the application of habeas corpus to the detention of
detainees, not to "the content of the law that governs petitioners'
detention."' A more recent decision in Al-Zahrani v. Rumsfeld
relied on Rasul II to deny a Bivens claim to a former Guantinamo
detainee, reasoning that Boumediene's silence on the issue of
detainee conditions or treatment meant that the Court intended
Boumediene to apply only to constitutional claims concerning
improper detention.' As the definitive opinion on Boumediene in
the D.C. Circuit, Rasul II interprets Boumediene as allowing only a
sliver of constitutional sunlight to reach Guantinamo, while
maintaining the blackout of other substantive constitutional rights.'54
149. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2252.
150. Id.
151. Rasul v. Myers, 563 F.3d 527, 529-30 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
152. Id. at 529 (citing Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2277).
153. Al-Zahrani v. Rumsfeld, 684 F. Supp. 2d 103, 112 (D.D.C. 2010) (citing Rasul II,
563 F.3d at 529-30).
154. See Rasul, 563 F.3d at 529-30.
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Those interpretations seem to run contrary to the way in which
the Boumediene Court discussed its decision. It did not hold that
habeas corpus was the only exportable right, but instead simply
declined discussion of the broader issue because its holding that
Congress's habeas corpus substitute-the DTA review process-was
a constitutionally inadequate substitution for habeas corpus rendered
the point moot."' The Court noted that "in view of our holding [that
the DTA is a constitutionally deficient substitute for habeas corpus]
we need not discuss the reach of the writ with respect to claims of
unlawful conditions of treatment or confinement.""' The most
plausible reading of the Boumediene Court's language is: When
Congress enacts a remedial scheme that purports to be the substitute
for a constitutional guarantee-like habeas corpus-that substitute
must offer a constitutionally acceptable minimum scope of
protection.1' Therefore, because the Court clearly found that habeas
corpus applies at Guantinamo Bay, the Congressional substitute was
inadequate due to its constitutional deficiencies.' Justice Kennedy
highlights several constitutional problems with Congress's alternative
habeas corpus scheme contained in the DTA: The inability of
detainees to present exculpatory evidence, the lack of a complete
record for appellate review, and the overall presumption in favor of
the government at the expense of the detainees."' These infirmities
compelled the Court to invalidate the DTA process and the relevant
section of the MCA as applied to habeas corpus proceedings."
The court in Al-Zahrani argues that Justice Kennedy's decision
to not discuss the application of habeas corpus to conditions of
detention requires an inference that section seven of the MCA still
should apply to such cases."' However, it is clear that Justice
Kennedy declines a lengthy discussion of detainee treatment because
he has already decided the issue. This was not an "unwillingness to
discuss the issue," but an unwillingness to beat a dead horse.162
155. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2274.
156. Id.
157. See id. at 2272-74.
158. Id. at 2262, 2274.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Al-Zahrani v. Rumsfeld, 684 F. Supp. 2d 103, 109 (D.D.C. 2010) (citing
Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2274).
162. Id. at 109.
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The court in Rasul II also bases its interpretation of Boumediene
partially upon what the opinion did not address, arguing that "the
Court stressed that its decision 'does not address the content of the
law that governs petitioners' detention.""" Based on these words, the
court decided that Boumediene "disclaimed any intention to disturb
existing law governing the extraterritorial reach of any constitutional
provisions, other than the Suspension Clause."'6" Yet, the court in
Rasul II ignores the subsequent sentence in Boumediene: "[t]hat is a
matter yet to be determined."' In other words, the Court, without a
Bivens claim or any other constitutional question beside the
extraterritorial application of habeas corpus before it, properly
decided only the question presented by the facts of Boumediene.
The D.C. Circuit misinterprets the refusal to create a rule in dicta as a
rule itself: no part of the Constitution, save habeas corpus, applies to
Guantdnamo Bay.6
Curiously, the D.C. Circuit cites both Eisentrager and Verdugo-
Urquidez in support of its contention that Boumediene did not work
any change in the extraterritorial application of the Constitution with
respect to Guantinamo Bay.'" In Boumediene, though, the Court
expressly placed Guantinamo Bay outside of the Eisentrager analysis
because, unlike the Landsberg Prison in Allied-occupied Germany,
the United States was the de facto sovereign of Guantdnamo Bay. 169
Verdugo-Urquidez offers even less support for the D.C. Circuit's
opinion, as all of the relevant government action occurred solely in
Mexico.' If there is one thing that Boumediene made clear, it is that
the Court views Guantinamo as something quite different from a
German prison or a part of Mexico. Otherwise, Justice Kennedy
would not have spent considerable time carefully distinguishing
Guantinamo's status from the earlier precedents.
That fact guts the D.C. Circuit's argument that inferring a Bivens
remedy for Guantdnamo would implicitly overrule the Supreme
163. Rasul v. Myers, 563 F.3d 527, 529 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (emphasis added) (citing
Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2277).
164. Rasul, 563 F.3d at 529.
165. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2277.
166. Id.
167. Rasul, 563 F.3d at 529-30.
168. Id.
169. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2257-58.
170. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 278 (1990) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring).
171. See Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2252-62.
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Court's precedents in Eisentrager and Verdugo-Urquidez, something
it is powerless to do."2 But an override of Supreme Court precedent
is not necessary. Boumediene did not overrule Eisentrager or
Verdugo-Urquidez either; those cases still enjoy precedential value."'
However, neither applies to the situation present at Guantdnamo. If
they did, Boumediene would have come out differently, and there
would not be a guarantee of habeas corpus at Guantinamo. Clearly
this was not Boumediene's holding. The Boumediene Court stated
that even in the closer of the two, the "situation in Eisentrager was far
different."1 4 Thus, the Court has carefully distinguished Guantinamo
Bay as an area from the earlier fact patterns.7
Viewed correctly, Boumediene provided a new analytical rubric
for issues pertaining to Guantdnamo Bay, different from the existing
Eisentrager and Verdugo-Urquidez framework. 6 The special status
of Guantdnamo as a sovereign gray area made it unique and required
the Court merely to distinguish-not overturn-prior precedent on its
way to the decision to apply habeas corpus in Guantdnamo.' As a
result, the D.C. Circuit's claim that its inability to overrule Eisentrager
or Verdugo-Urquidez precludes it from inferring a Bivens remedy is a
straw man. Nothing need be overruled; the D.C. Circuit need only
follow Boumediene.
Nor is there any principled basis on which to restrict
Boumediene's approach to extraterritorial constitutional analysis for
Guantinamo to habeas corpus."' Though the Court dealt only with
habeas corpus in Boumediene, the Court's reasoning concerning de
facto and de jure sovereignty applies equally well to other portions of
the Constitution. Indeed, Justice Kennedy's analysis relies on
extraterritorial application of various constitutional provisions,
implying that the extraterritorial application of the Constitution is not
limited to particular provisions.'7 ' At bottom, under Boumediene,
172. Rasul, 563 F3d. at 529 (citing Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc.,
490 U.S. 477, 484 (1989)).
173. See Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2257-58 (citing Eisentrager and Verdugo-Urquidez
with approval).
174. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2261.
175. Id. at 2252-62.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 2262.
179. Id. at 2254-62.
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Guantinamo should not be analyzed as foreign soil, but as an area
within the de facto sovereignty of the United States.
B. Step Two - National Security Is Not a 'Special Factor' That Blocks
Bivens Actions by Guantainamo Detainees
Although Wilkie shows reluctance by the recent Court to expand
Bivens, even the Wilkie Court endorsed a "common law" balancing
test between "reasons for and against the creation of a new cause of
action."'8 In Padilla v. Yoo, Judge Jeffrey White of the Northern
District of California employed the Wilkie balancing test and found
that a former terrorism detainee could pursue a Bivens action against
former Bush Administration attorney John Yoo."' The plaintiff was
an American citizen and suffered the alleged constitutional violations
while detained in a navy brig in South Carolina." There was no issue
in the case about extraterritorial application of the Constitution, as
constitutional protections clearly apply to an American in South
Carolina. But the case does illustrate an issue that affects both
Guantdnamo detainees and Mr. Padilla-how "national security" is
to be assessed as a special factor in inferring a Bivens remedy for a
suspected "War on Terror" detainee.
Judge White began his analysis by noting that "special factors
counseling hesitancy 'relate not to the merits of the particular
remedy, but to the question of who should decide whether such a
remedy should be provided.""8  Judge White interpreted this as
meaning that in some areas (either constitutionally compelled or, in
some cases, not), courts defer to the political branches to construct
their own remedial schemes.'" Acknowledging the modern Court's
tendency to limit expansion of Bivens, Judge White distinguished the
present case from those in which the Court declined a new Bivens
remedy.'
180. Wilkie v. Robbins, 551 U.S. 537, 554 (2007) (citing Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367,
378 (1983)).
181. Padilla v. Yoo, 633 F. Supp. 2d 1005, 1019 (N.D. Cal. 2009).
182. Id. at 1013.
183. Id. at 1022 (citing Sanchez-Espinoza v. Reagan, 770 F.2d 202, 208 (D.C. Cir. 1985)
(quoting Lucas, 462 U.S. at 380)).
184. Padilla, 633 F. Supp. 2d at 1022 (citing In re Iraq and Afghanistan Detainees
Litigation, 479 F. Supp. 2d 85, 103 (D.D.C. 2007) (quoting Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S.
296, 304 (1983))).
185. Padilla, 633 F. Supp. 2d at 1023 (citing Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412, 421
(1988)).
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Unlike Lucas, Congress does not occupy the relevant field and
did not create a "complex system" to redress grievances for "War on
Terror" detainees.'" Similarly, unlike Schweiker, the plaintiff in
Padilla lacked any "elaborate administrative remedies" for his
grievance.1' Judge White also distinguished the present case from the
military context provided by Chappell and Stanley, arguing that,
unlike those cases, a Bivens remedy for detainees presented "no
danger of intrusion upon the unique disciplinary structure of the
military establishment."'8 Finally, Judge White distinguished Padilla
from In re Iraq and Afghanistan Detainees Litigation."9 In In re Iraq,
the District Court for the District of Columbia denied Bivens claims
to foreign citizens suing for deprivation of constitutional rights in Iraq
and Afghanistan." The In re Iraq court determined that allowing
Bivens claims for enemy aliens detained on foreign soil would
undermine the United States military mission and weaken the
Nation's ability to fight an effective war.'91 Judge White distinguished
the case, noting that the plaintiff in Padilla was a citizen detained
within Untied States sovereignty. 92
Unlike the plaintiff in Padilla, all of the GuantAnamo detainees
who could bring Bivens claims are foreign nationals.'3 Despite this,
In re Iraq is still distinguishable. The thrust of the D.C. District
Court's holding in In re Iraq was the combination of the foreign
character of the plaintiffs plus the territory where they were detained
being under foreign control and sovereignty. 94 The In re Iraq court
cited Eisentrager and Verdugo-Urquidez to support its contention that
non-resident aliens are not afforded constitutional protection, but it
also cited Zadvydas v. Davis, recognizing that the application of the
Constitution is contingent upon location."' The Zadvydas Court
declared that "certain constitutional protections available to persons
inside the United States are unavailable to aliens outside of our
186. Id. (citing Lucas, 462 U.S. at 389).
187. Id. at 1024 (citing Schweiker, 487 U.S. at 423).
188. Padilla, 633 F. Supp. 2d at 1025.
189. Id. at 1024-25.
190. In re Iraq and Afghanistan Detainees Litigation, 479 F. Supp. 2d 85, 103 (D.D.C.
2007).
191. Id. at 105-06 (citing Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 774 (1950)).
192. Padilla, 633 F. Supp. 2d at 1025.
193. See List of Guantanamo Detainees, supra note 10.
194. In re Iraq, 479 F. Supp. 2d at 95.
195. Id. at 98 (citing Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001)).
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geographic borders," implying that non-citizens within these
boundaries receive some degree of constitutional protections.'9 Or,
as the In re Iraq court interpreted Zadvydas, the Constitution does
"not extend to nonresident aliens outside the territorial boundaries of
the United States," signaling that the D.C. Circuit recognizes a degree
of constitutional-applicability to nonresident aliens within
constitutional boundaries."
Measured against Boumediene's analysis distinguishing
Guantinamo from Eisentrager and Verdugo-Urquidez, recasting
"territorial boundaries" as "de jure and de facto sovereignty," and
rejecting formalistic sovereignty tests in favor of a functional policy
for determining actual American power over the base, In re Iraq is
distinguishable from Bivens actions brought by GuantAnamo
detainees. Boumediene answered the question of territorial
application by carefully examining Guantdnamo's legal status before
extending habeas corpus rights.'98 Thus, Boumediene renders the
holding of In re Iraq moot as applied to Guantinamo detainees. Just
as Guantinamo was not a temporary prison camp in Germany, nor in
Mexico and subject to Mexican law and sovereignty, it is not a prison
in Iraq or Afghanistan. By redefining the status of Guantinamo for
purposes of extraterritorial application of the Constitution, the
Supreme Court has distinguished its detainees from those in the prior
cases. Thus, Guantinamo detainees' access to Bivens remedies
appears closer to Mr. Padilla's than to the German POWs of
Eisentrager, the Mexican citizen injured in Mexico of Verdugo-Lopez,
or suspected terrorists and enemy combatants held in Iraq or
Afghanistan.
Having distinguished the controlling precedent regarding
administrative or congressionally compelled special factors, Judge
White addressed Yoo's arguments that relevant substantive law
counseled hesitation. Specifically, Yoo grounded this argument in the
Authorization for Use of Military Force ("AUMF"), the
constitutional delegation of military procedure to political branches, a
"national security" exception, and foreign relation concerns." After
considering each argument, Judge White rejected Yoo's arguments
and allowed the plaintiff a Bivens remedy. 200
196. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 693 (emphasis added).
197. In re Iraq, 479 F. Supp. 2d at 98.
198. Id. at 99.
199. Padilla v. Yoo, 633 F. Supp. 2d 1005, 1025-30 (N.D. Cal. 2009).
200. Id. at 1030.
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The AUMF allowed the President to "use all necessary and
appropriate force" against the nations responsible for the September
11 terrorist attacks in order to "prevent any future acts of
international terrorism against the United States." 20 1 Judge White
conceded that the AUMF granted the President discretion to
"formulate the response to terrorism against the United States."202 At
the same time, Judge White pointed out that this power is neither all-
encompassing nor immune from judicial review.203 The AUMF did
not speak "specifically or definitively regarding the constitutional
standards for the designation or treatment of enemy combatants,"
and it did not create any remedial scheme like the system analyzed in
Schweiker.2* Subject to judicial review, bereft of enabling language
regarding constitutional standards, and lacking a remedial scheme,
the AUMF did not function as a "special factor" that would counsel
hesitancy for a Bivens action.205
The Constitution delegates war powers to the President and
Congress.206 Judge White recognized that "undoubtedly the
'Constitution recognizes that the core strategies of war making belong
in the hands of those who are best positioned and most politically
accountable for making them."' 207  Judge White distinguished this
indisputable power on the grounds that while preventing enemy
combatants from returning to the battlefield was a "fundamental
incident of war," there was no indication that the plaintiff's detention
was intended to keep him from returning to the battlefield.208 More
importantly, Judge White identified the tension between the "core
strategic matters of war making" and "possible constitutional
trespass" on the rights of detained parties. 2' As the Supreme Court
noted in Hamdi, the constitutional delegation of war powers does not
provide the political branches with a "blank check" to override
constitutional protections or restrict courts from exercising "their own
time-honored and constitutionally mandated roles of reviewing and
201. AUMF, supra note 6.
202. Padilla, 633 F. Supp. 2d at 1026.
203. Id. (citing Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 535-36 (2004) (holding that executive
decisions made pursuant to the AUMF are reviewable by courts)).
204. Padilla, 633 F. Supp. 2d at 1026-27.
205. Id.
206. See U.S. Const. art. I, § 8; U.S. Const. art. II, § 2.
207. Padilla, 633 F. Supp. 2d at 1027 (quoting Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 531).
208. Id. (citing Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 519).
209. Padilla, 633 F. Supp. 2d at 1028 (citing Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 535).
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resolving" constitutional claims.210 Indeed, the constitutional
delegation of war powers "assuredly envisions a role for all three
branches when individual liberties are at stake." 21  The judiciary's
role is to oversee the use of the war power, because even the
importance of war cannot remove the "constitutional limitations
safeguarding essential liberties." 212 Accordingly, Judge White rejected
Yoo's argument that the constitutional delegation of war powers to
the political branches removed the judiciary's ability to evaluate war-
related constitutional claims.213
Yoo's next argument goes to the heart of the different
approaches of Padilla and Rasul II: the use of "national security" or
interference with foreign relations as special factors counseling
hesitancy.214  Essentially, Yoo argued that discovery of relevant
materials would expose sensitive information that could potentially
jeopardize national security and interfere with foreign relations.215
Judge White dismissed these arguments for a variety of reasons, but
focused primarily on the plaintiff's American citizenship and presence
within the actual borders of the United States.216  Though Judge
White acknowledged the practical difficulties and potentially sensitive
national security questions that might arise during discovery, he
correctly characterized Yoo's national security argument as an
individual attempting to take advantage of the "state secrets"
evidentiary privilege.217 If such a state secrets problem should
"surface on behalf of the government," the court could address it
during discovery rather than barring the case altogether. In other
words, Judge White would cross the evidentiary bridge when the
occasion came, but this concern was not enough to keep the court
from hearing the case.219
210. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 535.
211. Id. at 536.
212. Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 426 (1934).
213. Padilla, 633 F. Supp. 2d at 1028.
214. Id.
215. Id. at 1028-29.
216. Id.
217. Id. at 1028.
218. Id. Judge White supported his reasoning in a footnote by citing the Ninth
Circuit's decision in Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc. 563 F.3d 992, 997 (9th Cir.
2009). However, the Ninth Circuit agreed to rehear the case en banc, with the final
decision still pending. See Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 586 F.3d 1108 (9th Cir.
2009).
219. Padilla, 633 F. Supp. 2d at 1028.
465
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
In Rasul II, the D.C. Circuit stated that its earlier decision in
Sanchez-Espinoza v. Reagan compelled dismissal of the plaintiff's
Bivens claim because of the "national security" special factor.2" The
plaintiffs in Sanchez-Espinoza were Nicaraguan nationals who
brought claims against federal officials stemming from the United
States' activities in support of Nicaraguan rebel groups.221 The D.C.
Circuit reasoned that "the special needs of foreign affairs must stay
our hand in the creation of damage remedies against military and
foreign policy officials for allegedly unconstitutional treatment of
foreign subjects causing injury abroad."222 In other words, the D.C.
Circuit refused to hold that American activities occurring outside of
United States sovereignty-like in Nicaragua-were subject to the
Constitution. 223  Rasul II found this language as controlling and
dismissed the plaintiff's claims on that basis, reasoning that Sanchez-
Espinoza's applicability to Guantinamo was "unaffected by the
Supreme Court's Boumediene decision." 224
As outlined above, the D.C. Circuit's reasoning that Boumediene
did not alter the sovereignty questions concerning Guantinamo is
unconvincing, and its interpretation of Sanchez-Espinoza is no
different, as it relies on a faulty interpretation of Boumediene. By
recasting Guantinamo as de facto American territory, Boumediene
placed the base within the same analytical framework as domestic
sites to which all the cases agree the Constitution undoubtedly
applies. 225 Boumediene did not expressly overrule Sanchez-Espinoza,
but it certainly made it inapplicable to Guantinamo by holding that
Guantinamo is functionally American territory, not foreign soil.2 26
After Boumediene, Rasul II's use of Sanchez-Espinoza as a "special
factor" is without merit or support.
The Second Circuit's en banc decision in Arar v. Ashcroft is
similarly distinguishable.2 27 In Arar, the plaintiff, a dual-citizen of
Canada and Syria, brought a Bivens action against several officials
involved in an "extraordinary rendition" to send him to Syria, where
220. Rasul v. Myers, 563 F.3d 527, 532 n.5 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (citing Sanchez-Espinoza v.
Reagan, 770 F.2d 202, 209 (D.C. Cir. 1985)).
221. Sanchez-Espinoza, 770 F.2d at 204.
222. Id. at 209.
223. Id.
224. Rasul, 563 F.3d at 532 n.5.
225. Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2262 (2008).
226. Id.
227. Arar v. Ashcroft, 585 F.3d 559 (2d Cir. 2009) (en banc) (emphasis in original).
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he was subsequently tortured by Syrian officials.2" The Second
Circuit denied a Bivens remedy, reasoning that the plaintiff's claim
would "enmesh the courts" in determining the proper motivations for
the "policy" of extraordinary rendition." The court was similarly
concerned with the complicated information-sharing agreements
between the three involved governments (the United States, Syria
and Canada), and the possibility of these arrangements becoming
public record through the open court system.230 Though the court
noted that it could "consider state secrets and even reexamine
judgments made in the foreign affairs context when [it] must," it
declined to recognize a Bivens remedy for maltreatment of a foreign
national abroad.231
As in Padilla, a hypothetical Bivens claim arising from a
Guantdnamo detainee does not present sensitive national security
issues that concerned the Second Circuit in Arar. First, though all of
the Guantdnamo detainees are foreign nationals, any relevant
constitutional violations have occurred in Guantdnamo, an area over
which the United States enjoys de facto sovereignty. 2  Second, the
inter-governmental concerns that drove the Second Circuit's decision
in Arar are not present for any Bivens action stemming from
confinement at Guantinamo. Unlike Arar, where the plaintiff was
transferred over to Syrian authorities, the detainees remained in
American custody at an American-controlled prison camp. Finally,
unlike the sensitive information the court sought to limit in Arar, the
allegations in a hypothetical detainee's Bivens complaint have already
been alleged in open court or the news media.233 In any event, this
problem is better addressed in the context of discovery, which is
beyond this scope of this article.
Following Judge White's approach in Padilla, Arar and Sanchez-
Espinoza should be limited to conduct occurring abroad, not on
228. Id. at 565-67.
229. Id. at 575.
230. Id. at 576-78.
231. Id. at 575 (citing Sanchez-Espinoza v. Reagan, 770 F.2d 202, 209 (D.C. Cir. 1985)).
232. See List of Guantanamo Detainees, supra note 10; Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct.
2229, 2252-62 (2008).
233. See generally Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1943-44 (2009); Padilla v. Yoo,
633 F. Supp. 2d 1005, 1013-14 (N.D. Cal. 2009); Rasul v. Myers, 563 F.3d 527, 528 (D.C.
Cir. 2009). For publicly available information concerning allegations of detainee
mistreatment at Guantdnamo, see Center for Constitutional Rights, Freedom of
Information Act: Ghost Detention and Extraordinary Rendition Case, http://ccrjustice.org/
GhostFOIA.
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sovereign American territory72 That result seems compelled after
Boumediene. By not overruling its own earlier cases from which the
Arar and Sanchez-Espinoza decisions derive, the Court was signaling
clearly that Guantinamo was different and should be treated as
American soil.2" A claim that alleges violations by American officials
at an American site to which the constitution applies is more
analogous to the situation presented by Padilla than the situation
presented by Arar. Thus, for hypothetical Guantdnamo Bivens
claims, Judge White's reasoning is illustrative and should be followed.
C. Step Three - Federal Officials Should Not Be Entitled to Qualified
Immunity for Maltreatment at Guantinamo
Qualified immunity serves to protect government officials from
liability for civil damages "insofar as their conduct does not violate
any clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a
reasonable person would have known."236 Qualified immunity
balances the "need to hold public officials accountable when they
exercise power irresponsibly" against the "need to shield officials
from harassment, distraction, and liability when they perform their
duties reasonably."" As part of the shielding function, qualified
immunity protects an official from being sued rather than only as a
defense to liability."' As Judge White points out in Padilla, courts
should caution against "eviscerat[ing] the notice pleading standard"
when deciding "far-reaching constitutional questions on a non-
existent factual record" often contained within a motion to dismiss
239based on qualified immunity.
In Saucier v. Katz, the Supreme Court established a rigid two-
part analysis to determine the availability of qualified immunity in a
Bivens action.2 O First, courts had to address whether the alleged facts
showed that the government official had violated the plaintiff's
constitutional rights.241 If there was no constitutional violation, then
the court need not even reach the question of qualified immunity, as
234. Padilla, 633 F. Supp. 2d at 1030.
235. See Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2252-62.
236. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1976).
237. Pearson v. Callahan, 129 S. Ct. 808, 815 (2009).
238. Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985).
239. Padilla, 633 F. Supp. 2d at 1031 (quoting Hydrick v. Hunter, 500 F.3d 978, 985
(9th Cir. 2007)).
240. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001).
241. Id.
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the Bivens action was untenable.242 If the court determined that there
was a constitutional violation, then it would address "whether the
right was clearly established." 243 If it is, then qualified immunity is not
available. Under Saucier, a right is "clearly established" when the
delimitations of the right are "sufficiently clear" that "a reasonable
official would understand that what he is doing violates that right."2 44
Anderson v. Creighton held that this conduct need not be held
explicitly unlawful, but that its unlawfulness must be "apparent" in
light of existing law.245 According to the Ninth Circuit, Anderson does
not create a requirement for officials to "predict[] the future course of
constitutional law." 246
Recently, in Pearson v. Callahan, the Supreme Court altered
Saucier by allowing lower courts discretion to decide which portion of
the analysis they would address first in light of the particular
circumstances of the case. 247 Each claim must be pleaded within the
pleading standard contained within the federal rules.248 Pursuant to
the pleading rules, the court will assume that the facts alleged therein
are true.2 49  For this hypothetical complaint, I assume that the
detainee's complaint contains a claim for violation of the Fifth
Amendment guarantee of due process for maltreatment while in
involuntary confinement.
Because the Eighth Amendment only applies to "punishment"
inflicted after a criminal conviction, the Fifth Amendment governs
pre-conviction involuntary detainee mistreatment.250 The scale of the
protection, however, is similar, as the protections afforded to pre-
conviction detainees must be "at least as great as the Eighth
Amendment protections available to a convicted prisoner."2 1
According to the Ninth Circuit, this standard establishes Eighth
242. Id.
243. Id. at 201.
244. Id. (citing Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987)).
245. Anderson, 483 U.S. at 640.
246. Ostlund v. Bobb, 825 F.2d 1371, 1374 (9th Cir. 1987).
247. Pearson v. Callahan, 129 S. Ct. 808, 818 (2009).
248. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1953-54 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 554-56 (2008)).
249. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556.
250. See generally City of Revere v. Mass. Gen. Hosp., 463 U.S. 239, 244 (1983); Bell v.
Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 n.16 (1979).
251. City of Revere, 463 U.S. at 244.
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Amendment precedent as a "minimum standard of care" for
determining the rights of pre-conviction detainees.252
Thus, a Bivens complaint would have to allege that the pre-
conviction detention at Guantinamo fell below a minimum Eighth
Amendment standard of care guaranteed by the Due Process clause.
In Padilla, the plaintiff's allegations that he was shackled in painful
positions, deprived of sleep by excess noise or light, denied necessary
medical care, and subjected to extreme psychological stress for the
purpose of enhancing interrogation demonstrated a violation of his
Due Process right to an Eighth Amendment minimum standard of
care for pretrial detention.25 Assuming that a hypothetical
Guantinamo detainee claim would include much of the same
material, it appears that it would allege facts sufficient to support a
violation of the Due Process right to minimum treatment standards.
The question, then, is whether the constitutional right violated
was well established with respect to Guantdnamo detainees. 254 Even
in cases of "novel factual circumstances," officials can still "be on
notice that their conduct violates established law." 255 That the Due
Process Clause would apply to foreign nationals held by the United
States within United States sovereignty is not a crackpot theory; it
was so held in Hamdi.256 In Padilla, Judge White argued that "[t]he
fact that a unique type or designation of a detainee has come into
being does not obliterate the clearly established minimum protections
for those held in detention."257 It seems likely therefore, that while
the plaintiff must define the right at the "appropriate level of
specificity" (i.e., that the right applies to the status he occupied as a
detainee) to defeat qualified immunity, he or she is not required to
show that the defendant's conduct had been previously declared
unconstitutional.258
While Judge White acknowledged that the law concerning the
designation of a citizen as an "enemy combatant" was "developing at
252. Or. Advocacy Ctr. v. Mink, 322 F.3d 1101, 1120 (9th Cir. 2003); see also Bell, 441
U.S. at 535 n.16 (noting that Due Process requirements for pretrial detainees must meet
Eighth Amendment standards); Burrell v. Hampshire County, 307 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 2002)
(analyzing pretrial mistreatment claims under Eighth Amendment framework).
253. Padilla v. Yoo, 633 F. Supp. 2d 1005, 1035 (N.D. Cal. 2009).
254. See Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 202 (2001).
255. Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 741 (2002).
256. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507,531 (2004).
257. Padilla, 633 F. Supp. 2d at 1036.
258. Id. at 1036-37 (citing Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 615 (1999); Blueford v.
Prunty, 108 F.3d 251, 254 (9th Cir. 1997)).
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the time of the conduct alleged in the complaint," he reasoned that
"federal officials were cognizant of the basic fundamental civil rights
afforded to detainees under the United States Constitution." 259  In
support, Judge White cited Estelle v. Gamble and Youngberg v.
Romero, two Supreme Court cases that held that officials should be
cognizant that involuntarily detained persons are entitled to medical
care and constitutional protections similar to those afforded to
*260
convicted prisoners.
Applying Judge White's reasoning from Padilla, though the law
regarding detainees and their Due Process rights was also
"developing at the time of the conduct alleged," federal officials still
should have been on notice that excessive force, maltreatment, or
other common Due Process violations were contrary to clearly
established rights. United States courts have long found that
maltreating prisoners or pretrial detainees is a clear violation of
constitutional rights.261 Maltreatment that is "totally without
penological justification" violates the Eighth Amendment's
protections for prisoners and Due Process guarantees for pretrial
262detainees. Furthermore, international agreements to which the
United States is a party-like the Geneva Convention-disclaim the
use of torture or deliberate maltreatment against enemy
combatants. 263  Those examples are persuasive support for the
argument that deliberately mistreating pretrial detainees was either
clearly established or reasonably predicted as forbidden by United
States constitutional law and by the Geneva Convention's
requirements. Though the United States has consistently argued that
Guantdnamo detainees do not fall within any of these categories, the
government and its officials should not be able to play fast and loose
with constitutional rights guaranteed to persons within United States
sovereignty. Instead, these officials should be held accountable for
their actions. Thus, courts should not allow federal officials
responsible for maltreatment of Guantinamo detainees to claim
259. Padilla, 633 F. Supp. 2d at 1037.
260. Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 321-22 (1982); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S.
97, 103-04 (1976).
261. See generally Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 738 (2002); Whitey v. Albers, 475 U.S.
312, 319 (1986).
262. Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 346 (1981).
263. Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 3, Aug.
12,1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135.
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qualified immunity for their actions by arguing that detainees did not
have clearly established constitutional rights.
Conclusion
Boumediene did much more than extend the right of habeas
corpus to Guantdnamo detainees. Justice Kennedy's majority
opinion eschewed the rigid formalism advanced by the government
and instead examined whether the United States served as the de
facto sovereign of Guantinamo. Finding that the United States
indeed exercised this privilege, Justice Kennedy found that extension
of habeas corpus rights to non-citizen detainees satisfied Justice
Harlan's "impracticable and anomalous" test from Reid v. Covert.
The same reasoning supports Bivens claims by detainees for
substantive constitutional violations. As Guantdnamo is a satellite
entity within the de facto sovereignty of the United States, Americans
officials there must abide by the Constitution. By the same token,
those detained at the prison also may avail themselves of the
Constitution's substantive protections. There is not an alternative
remedial scheme for potential detainee claims. None of the special
factor considerations established by previous precedent applies to the
facts of a hypothetical claim. Government officials could infer that
their actions were contrary to domestic and international law, thereby
quashing their claims to qualified immunity. As long as a detainee
could allege violations of a clearly established constitutional right,
courts should allow a Bivens action to move forward.
Furthermore, though the holding in Boumediene is clearly
limited to Guantinamo, the Court's adoption of the impracticable
and anomalous test suggests that its reasoning may apply to other
areas outside of the United States' de jure sovereignty. It is uncertain
the extent to which the Court would apply this reasoning to other
areas. What is clear, however, is that the Court clearly indicated that
Guantdnamo Bay was something different than the government
thought it ought to be. At the very least, courts should accord the
decision the weight and respect customarily afforded to the United
States Supreme Court.
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